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SINCE R.D. LAING (1960) coined thephrase ‘ontological insecurity’ in themid-20th century, various literatures
have sought to develop this concept in a way
that can be applicable to social cognition.
Defined broadly as the feeling attached to
the stability (or lack thereof) that people
perceive in both their self-identity and their
surrounding environments (Giddens, 1990),
ontological insecurity has been linked to a
range of issues – most notably mental ill
health (Laing, 1960) and a hardening of
social attitudes (Young, 1999).
According to Young (1999), ‘the precari-
ousness of human existence and the need
for a viable Umwelt necessitates a whole
series of defensive mechanisms’ (p.97), with
one such mechanism proposed to be a 
(re-)hardening of social values and attitudes.
In Jonathan Haidt’s TED talk, he exempli-
fied this through a reference to Hieronymus
Bosch’s triptych, ‘The Garden of Earthly
Delights’ (Figure 1). In this painting, Bosch
provides a schematic that is akin to social
decay, based on liberalisation and a lowering
of Government control (Bosch painted this
as God). Haidt contended that this
schematic can act as a metaphor for why we
revert to more conservative outlooks
following a period of liberalisation.
Existing theories within the 
social psychological literature
Social psychological inquiry into the roots of
political orientations has traditionally been
based around the notion that these ideolog-
ical stances help to address particular
psychological needs. Moral Foundations
Theory (MFT; Haidt & Graham, 2007), for
example, asserts that political identities are
driven largely by the extent to which people
subscribe to different moral domains, each
of which describes a particular set of political
values. Six of these moral domains have been
identified (Haidt, 2012): 
1. Care: looking after vulnerable people or
groups.
2. Fairness: support for the fair distribution
of social resources.
3. Loyalty: pride in one’s group and national
identity.
4. Authority: respect for established social
hierarchies.
5. Sanctity: a drive to avoid exposure to
socially-taboo or harmful behaviours. 
6. Liberty: a desire for economic and/or
lifestyle freedom from Government
interference. 
Haidt and colleagues have, over several
years, examined the moral profiles of self-
identified Liberals, Conservatives, and Liber-
tarians from a number of societies (e.g. the
US, UK, Japan, India) through data
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At the recent 30th Annual PsyPAG Conference in Glasgow, I was fortunate enough to be awarded the
organisation’s Rising Researcher Award. As part of this award, I was invited to present work that myself and
colleagues have been doing at the University of Lincoln on the social psychology of social and political
orientations. In this article, I review some of the key theories currently used in this area, before describing some
data that we’ve collected prior to the 2015 British General Election. I then conclude the article by outlining
some potential avenues for further research.
collected using a publicly-available research
website, and found significant differences in
the endorsement of these moral foundations
between ideological groups. Liberals, for
instance, strongly endorse statements
derived from the care domain, followed by
the fairness domain (conceptualised by
Liberals as equality of outcomes), and the
(lifestyle) liberty domain, but typically reject
items from the other domains. By compar-
ison, Conservatives endorse all moral
domains equally highly, whilst Libertarians
reject all of the moral domains, with the
exception of economic and lifestyle liberty.
According to Haidt’s group, these differ-
ences are fundamental when trying to
explain the increasingly polarised nature of
American politics.
Other theories of worldview defence have
also sought to explain the impact of the need
for a clear and coherent perception of the
social world on social and political attitudes.
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Green-
berg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986) offers
an empirically-tested theoretical paradigm
for understanding why attitudes toward
social issues may become hardened in the
face of perceived external threats, such as
political criticism, and immigration.
According to TMT, having a strong cultural
worldview acts as an emotional buffer when
contemplating mortality by providing a sense
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Figure 1: Bosch’s ‘The Garden of Earthly Delights’
(from: www.hieronymous-bosch.org).
of purpose to a time-limited lifespan. TMT
studies artificially induce mortality salience
in order to examine the effects of this on
views about potentially worldview-threat-
ening issues. Studies have found that
mortality salience contributes to the expres-
sion of more conservative and insular atti-
tudes about a range of political topics, such
as support for the ruling Government
(Landau et al., 2004), patriotism
(Pyszczynski et al., 2006), military action
against foreign enemies (Motyl, Hart &
Pyszczynski, 2009), and the endorsement of
enhanced interrogation (torture) tech-
niques (Luke & Hartwig, 2014). In addition
to these ‘nation-strengthening’ effects,
experimentally increasing mortality salience,
has also been associated with prejudicial
judgements of immigrants (Motyl et al.,
2011), and punitive responses to lawbreakers
(Jost et al., 2003).
Further, System Justification Theory (SJT;
Jost & Banaji, 1994) asserts that people not
only require a clear and consistent world-
view, but also need to see this worldview, and
its central social structures and hierarchies,
as being fair and just. SJT studies examine
this phenomenon by manipulating levels of
‘system threat’ (typically through the presen-
tation of a mock criticism, advocated by an
outsider in the form of a news story or
similar vignette) in relation to the partici-
pants’ home culture (e.g. Kay, Jost & Young,
2005). Studies have repeatedly found that
participants in high system threat conditions
are motivated to endorse the prevailing
social status quo, and advocate that social
structures and hierarchies are fair, even if
this means derogating social victims and
attributing blame to those at the bottom of
the societal hierarchy for the positions in
which they find themselves (Kay et al., 2005).
Synthesising sociological and psycholog-
ical work, van Marle and Maruna (2010)
suggested that linking the sociological
concept of ‘ontological insecurity’ with an
empirical approach like TMT could provide
a more valid context to TMT theorists trying
to explain the social significance of their lab-
based findings, whilst simultaneously
providing experimental support for the soci-
ological literature on ontological insecurity.
Van Marle and Maruna (2010) cited van den
Bos et al.’s (2005) work on ‘uncertainty
reduction’, which suggested that ‘mortality
salience’ may be replaceable by other free-
floating existential anxieties (through, for
example, societal inequality) and achieve the
same effects in relation to social and political
attitudes.
More recently, Malka et al. (2014) exam-
ined needs for security and certainty (NSC)
in relation to social and economic conser-
vatism in a large sample of over 73,000
participants from over 50 countries. What
they reported was a more nuanced relation-
ship between NSC and conservatism than
would have been expected using these
previous theories. Whilst participants who
scored highly in relation to NSC (measured
using selected items from the World Values
Survey) expressed more conservative atti-
tudes in relation to social issues (e.g. an
opposition to homosexuality, abortion,
immigration, and support for the harsh
punishment of criminals), these same partic-
ipants were typically more left-leaning with
regards to economic policies (e.g. support
for welfare programmes, and an opposition
to income inequality). This effect, however,
was only present within participants low on a
measure of political engagement. Highly
politically engaged participants in Malka et
al.’s (2014) study who also scored highly in
relation to NSC expressed the expected
trend, and supported both culturally and
economically conservative policies. With
these findings in mind, it is important to
consider political ideology as a multifaceted
phenomenon.
What have we done?
The studies described above all used
different measures to examine each of the
pivotal variables involved in this area. With
no standardised measures of ontological
insecurity currently available within either
the sociological or psychological literatures,
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we sought to address this gap in the lead-up
to the 2015 UK General Election.
My supervisor (Professor Todd Hogue)
and I collaborated with a local news organi-
sation, The Lincolnite, to collect data on
voting intentions before the Election last
May. We drafted a 25-item measure of onto-
logical insecurity, based on factors that were
outlined in the sociological literature. Data
were collected from 550 participants, and we
were able to confirm the four-factor struc-
ture of an 18-item, psychometrically reliable
Ontological Insecurity Scale (OIS), which
was differentially associated with conserva-
tive and liberal attitudes.
High scores on the ‘Social Change’ factor
of the OIS were associated with conservative
social and political attitudes, whilst partici-
pants with high scores on the ‘Societal
Inequality’ OIS factor were more likely to
endorse liberal attitudes (Figure 2). 
We found no significant differences in
relation to ontological insecurity scores
between the supporters of specific political
parties, with the exception of UKIP, whose
voters scored significantly higher on the OIS
than participants supporting any other party.
However, when divided into ‘high’ and ‘low’
(based on their scores on the OIS), partici-
pants who expressed supporting either the
Conservatives or Labour differed signifi-
cantly in relation to their social and political
values. In both cases, participants scoring
higher on the OIS scores expressed more
conservative sentiments (lower scores) on
the political attitudes questionnaire. This
trend was also observed among ‘Undecided’
voters, indicating the potential impact of
communication styles (in either increasing
or decreasing OIS-relevant sentiments) on
voting behaviour and electoral outcomes.
Figure 3 graphically shows these differences.
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Figure 2: The relationship between OIS scores and social and political attitudes.
We are currently preparing two papers
based on this data, each of which outline the
development and validation of the measure-
ment tools used. We hope to have these
ready for journal submission prior to the end
of this year.
Where next?
There are a number of potential avenues for
further research that are open on the basis
of these data, which predominantly fall into
three areas: partisanship, political communi-
cation, and implicit processing styles based
on OIS scores.
British-based research into the demonisa-
tion and partisanship hypotheses made by
Haidt’s team in the US could be conducted
in conjunction with an analysis of the role of
ontological insecurity levels in forming
judgements about specific policy proposals.
Studies examining this interaction could use
labelled and label-free policy suggestions,
with a key hypothesis being that if partisan-
ship guides policy support, judgements
would be dependent upon the party to
which they were labelled as belonging to,
regardless of OIS scores. However, if onto-
logical insecurity has an impact on policy
support, it would be expected that label-free
conservative policies would receive more
support from those scoring high on the OIS,
independent of participants’ party affilia-
tions.
Another potentially fruitful area of
research is in political communication. For
example, could it be that people who are
ontologically insecure attend and respond
more to affect-based information than those
scoring lower on the OIS? Vignette studies
could be conducted here, with a possible
hypothesis being that affectively-laden
vignettes would have more of an influence
on the social judgements of those scoring
high on the OIS than those scoring low.
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Figure 3: Social and political attitudes of party supporters, by OIS score grouping.
Finally, it may be possible to use indirect
methodologies (e.g. implicit association
tests, or mousetracking) to assess the
processing styles of high/low OIS scorers in
relation to contentious social issues, such as
criminal justice, immigration, and welfare.
Using this paradigm, it would be expected
that differences in the implicit processing of
information about these issues would be
detectable in people with high or low scores
on the key OIS factors of ‘Social Change’
and ‘Societal Inequality’.
Conclusions
From the data that we have collected, onto-
logical insecurity seems to have the potential
to be pivotal in political behaviour. The
social and political attitudes of undecided
voters in our sample varied significantly as a
function of ontological insecurity scores, and
with up to a third of voters still being unde-
cided in the final week of election
campaigns, how political parties capitalise
on (or alleviate) levels of ontological insecu-
rity could play a major role in electoral
outcomes. By studying these processes exper-
imentally, it may be possible for psychologists
to become engaged within the political
process to a greater extent than seen before,
and advise politicians on how to maximise
their potential for electoral success.
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MAKING MORAL DECISIONS is animportant part of what it is to behuman and people have been
pondering moral questions for centuries.
However, Western traditions have tended to
place importance on the role of rational
processes in moral judgments, and until
fairly recently, so did psychologists. But these
approaches ignore the role of moral intu-
itions. Over the past decade, moral
psychology has begun to investigate auto-
matic bases of moral judgment, moving away
from tendencies to view morality as solely the
result of reasoning. This growing field
suggests that moral judgments are affected
by manipulations outside of conscious aware-
ness or that would not be endorsed as the
causes of judgments. Resultantly, in more
recent years some social psychologists have
proposed theories which suggest that most
moral judgments tend to be the result of
quick intuitive and affective processes rather
than rational ones. Moral Foundations
Theory (MFT) presents as one such
example. 
Drawing from evolutionary and cultural
psychology, MFT provides a social psycholog-
ical framework to account for why moral
beliefs vary so much across individuals and
cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). MFT
explains this divergence by suggesting that
people are born with innate sets of moral
values that are shaped by their cultural
context, such that some values become more
important than others over time. These
values are referred to as ‘moral foundations’.
In contrast to other conceptions of morality,
MFT appreciates the importance of social
learning and proposes that moral systems
should be defined as sets of values that bind
communities and make social life possible
(Graham & Haidt, 2010; Haidt & Kesebir,
2010). 
MFT contrasts traditional explorations of
moral judgment that focus on justice and
harm, and consign concerns around things
like purity and patriotism to a non-moral
sphere. MFT draws on evolutionary
psychology to suggest that foundations are
sets of related adaptive modules that have
evolved in response to recurrent social chal-
lenges (Graham et al., 2012). Foundations
thus provide an innate structure that
constrains the moralities that can be formed
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Moral Foundation Theory (MFT) was coined by a group of social and cultural psychologists. This theory
proposes that several innate sets of moral concerns or ‘foundations’ underpin moral judgment. Theoretically,
MFT posits that moral judgments tend to be intuitive and affective. Nonetheless, despite this commitment to
intuitionism, most MFT research is conducted using self-report measures. Where work has examined intuitive
processes, this tends to explore foundations in isolation and, therefore, does not provide an understanding
of how an individual’s moral intuitions relate to one another and to their deliberated moral judgements. 
MFT makes an important contribution to social psychology by seeking to explain the diversity of moral beliefs
and values found across people and cultures. However, there are still significant gaps in MFT research. 
This paper outlines the need to develop ways of mapping moral intuitions within the context of MFT. 
across cultures. At present there is good
evidence for five foundations. These are
outlined in Table 1, along with related adap-
tive problems and intuitive responses
(adapted from Graham et al., 2012).
Theoretically, MFT is committed to the
following four claims: nativism – there is an
innate and universal ‘first draft’ of morality
(Graham et al., 2012) prepared to learn
social values and norms; cultural learning –
this ‘first draft’ results in a hardwired apti-
tude for learning and can, therefore, be
edited by cultural context (Graham et al.,
2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004); intuitionism –
moral judgments tend to occur as a result of
automatic and non-conscious intuitions,
rather than by explicit and deliberative
reasoning (Haidt & Joseph, 2004); and
pluralism – there are multiple moral founda-
tions (Graham et al., 2011). 
Whilst a major objective of MFT has been
to provide an account of moral diversity
across individuals and cultures, it was initially
developed to explore moral conflict between
differing political ideologies (Graham, Haidt
& Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007;
Haidt et al., 2009). MFT predicts that the
intractability of moral disputes associated
with liberal/conservative divides can be
explained by differences in patterns of moral
foundations, where liberals and conserva-
tives prioritise contrasting sets of values
(Haidt & Graham, 2007; Koleva et al., 2012).
Multiple studies show that liberals place
greater emphasis on Care and Fairness, also
referred to as individuating foundations,
while conservatives place greater emphasis
than liberals on Loyalty, Authority, and Sanc-
tity, the binding foundations (Graham et al.,
2009, 2011; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015). For
example, in debates about gay marriage,
liberals are unlikely to encounter Care or
Fairness violations and so do not have moral
objections, while conservatives perceive
violations of Loyalty (outsiders infiltrating
wholesome families and communities),
Authority (disrespect for tradition and tradi-
tional family life), and Sanctity (as disgusting
or unnatural). MFT can, therefore, go some
way to explaining attitudes towards policy
issues. For example, Koleva et al. (2012)
found that self-rated endorsements of moral
foundations predicted moral attitudes and
disapproval across 20 controversial topics
(e.g. abortion, death penalty, gay marriage,
etc.), even after controlling for political
ideology. Furthermore, Day et al. (2014)
found that relevant foundation-related
framing bolstered political attitudes in both
conservatives and liberals. Findings such as
these suggest that MFT provides a useful
empirical framework for mapping moral
diversity. 
However, the empirical work outlined
thus far has relied on self-report measures of
moral foundations, specifically the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al.,
2011), to map individual moral domains and
explore links to political ideology. This begs
the question: If intuitionism is a core tenet of
MFT, why rely on self-report for identifying
participants’ moral mappings?
As an intuitionist theory, research on
intuitive foundation-related moral judge-
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Table 1: Moral Foundations and related adaptive challenges and intuitive responses.
Foundation Adaptive Challenge Intuitive Responses
Care/Harm Protecting offspring Compassion, anger at perpetrator
Authority/Subversion Forming beneficial relationships Respect, fear
Fairness/Cheating Gaining reciprocal benefits Anger, gratitude, guilt
Sanctity/Degradation Avoiding disease Disgust
Loyalty/Betrayal Forming cohesive coalitions Group pride, anger at traitors
ment provides important evidence for MFT.
There is a growing body of evidence in this
area. For instance, Schnall et al. (2008)
showed that incidental disgust (intuitive
response associated with Sanctity) increased
the harshness of participants’ moral judg-
ments when they exposed to disgust-
inducing stimuli and manipulations. In
addition, differences in disgust sensitivity
have been shown to predict intuitive nega-
tivity towards gay people, as measured by an
Implicit Association Test and by intention-
ality assessments (Inbar et al., 2009).
Furthermore, a number of studies have
found support for ideological effects with
regard to implicit processing. For example,
Helzer and Pizarro (2011) found links
between political conservatism and disgust.
Participants reported more conservative
political orientations in the presence of
visual reminders of physical purity (a hand
sanitiser or hand-washing sign) were more
likely to report conservative orientations and
made harsher judgements regarding sexual
violations. Findings like this indicate that
manipulations of implicit foundation-related
triggers can influence conscious decision-
making. 
Nevertheless, research into moral intu-
itions remains severely limited for a number
of reasons. First, although there is a growing
field exploring intuitive processes for
different foundation-related concerns, to
date this work has focused on single founda-
tions in isolation, mainly Sanctity (Graham et
al., 2012; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Schnall et
al., 2008), rather than how foundations
relate to one another in an individual’s
moral domain. Second, existing studies
investigating moral intuitions have tended to
explore effects as mediated through political
ideology (Graham, 2010; Helzer & Pizarro,
2011). However, relatively little is known
about how intuitive foundation-related
moral judgment compares to explicit deci-
sion-making as little research directly
compares intuitive processing to self-
reported endorsements of foundations. 
There is presently a need in MFT
research to adapt methodology to be able to
examine participants’ intuitive moral
domain. Thus far, a number of methods have
been used to bypass self-report to measure
foundation-related intuitions more directly
(Graham et al., 2012). These have included:
evaluative priming – foundation-related
word primes flashed before positive/nega-
tive adjective targets; effect misattribution –
foundation-related image primes flashed
before neutral character targets; and finan-
cial trade-offs – quick responses to dichoto-
mous questions about the amount of money
required by participant for different founda-
tion-violations. Nevertheless, these method-
ologies have yet to be adapted to develop an
intuitive version of self-report scales and
allow researchers to map the intensities of
each foundation in a participant’s intuitive
moral domain and further a more holistic
understanding of individuals’ moral intu-
itions.
By proposing that a handful of innate,
but variably developed, psychological struc-
tures are the foundations of human morality,
MFT is able to account for why moral systems
vary so much across different people and
cultures, yet also show so many recurrent
themes. MFT, therefore, provides a social
psychological theory that can explain differ-
ences and similarities in moral decision-
making, social attitudes, and political
ideology. However, to date this work has
been mainly limited to explicit moral
reasoning and there is currently a dearth of
research exploring how moral intuitions vary
across individuals and cultures. Addressing
this gap will be essential for future social and
moral psychologists. 
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PSYCHOLOGY is a science thatcontributes greatly to a number ofother Science, Technology, Engi-
neering, and Mathematics (STEM) disci-
plines. Utilising scientific methods,
psychologists create knowledge and solve
real-world problems, with very practical
implications. Unfortunately, psychology is
not often recognised as a STEM discipline,
or at least not consistently across different
bodies (American Psychological Association,
2010; Sage, 2010). 
As the scientific study of the mind and
behaviour, the impact of psychology on
society is very clear. From improving health
and wellbeing, to understanding behaviour,
psychology has an impact on most aspects of
our everyday lives. For example, psycholo-
gists have been involved in designing British
coins to aid the visually impaired (Bruce &
Hellawell, 1988); safety aspects and the
ergonomic layout of cockpits (Craik, 1940);
and developing rear-facing pushchairs to
assist parent-child interaction (Zeedyk,
2008). Beyond this, psychologists have
helped to develop effective educational
programmes, influence public health policy,
inform legislation, create care systems,
produce statistical techniques and shine a
light on complex decision making. 
Many real-world problems require collab-
oration among disciplines, which is some-
thing that psychology does very well. This is
important because forging connections with
other disciplines and areas of research is one
way which may enhance psychology’s
standing as a core STEM discipline.
Research students play a key role in this, as
they are increasingly working on complex,
but innovative inter-disciplinary PhDs. For
example, my own doctoral research brought
together core ideas about social, cognitive,
and health psychology by focusing on how
an individual’s relationship with their envi-
ronment promotes or inhibits excessive
alcohol consumption (Hill, 2014). Not only
is alcohol misuse an area of public health
concern, but these ideas potentially have
implications for environmental design 
and how we understand complex social
behaviours. 
Over time, the public are becoming more
receptive to the work that psychologists do,
but these perceptions may not always be
accurate. For example, if you were to ask a
member of the public what a psychologist
does, how closely would this description
reflect what you do on a daily basis? The
many reasons for these often inaccurate
perceptions are beyond the scope of this
article (see Klatzky, 2009), but it is our
responsibility as psychologists to communi-
cate the value of what we do to others and to
consider the impact of our research. As
Miller (1969) suggested, wherever possible,
we must give away innovative methods, inter-
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Discussion paper:
Psychology as a STEM discipline
Dr Kimberley Hill
Psychology is a science that contributes greatly to a number of other Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) disciplines. Unfortunately, it is not often recognised as a STEM discipline. This
discussion paper considers psychology’s membership as a STEM subject and the impact that it has had on our
everyday lives. The author suggests that postgraduate students working on innovative, inter-disciplinary research
can not only contribute to psychology’s standing, but can also help to communicate the value of what
psychologists do. Reflections from the author’s experiences as a STEM Ambassador are also included, with
reference to The University of Northampton’s unique STEM Steering Group and STEM Champions programme.
ventions or results which contribute to the
public good.
There are a number of ways to do this,
from publishing research to presenting at
conferences. One way that I achieved this as
a postgraduate student was by becoming a
National STEM Ambassador. STEM Ambas-
sadors support students, teachers and educa-
tional establishments by enriching and
enhancing the psychology curriculum. For
example, by going into schools and
informing students about psychology-related
careers, or helping to support teachers in
lessons. Following training, I found myself
helping to organise and taking part in a
number of STEM events, including A-level
research conferences, open days and Science
Bazaar festivals. 
Research students aiming for a career in
academia are often told that a PhD is not
enough, leaving many students trying to find
ways to enhance their skills and stand out
from other candidates. My own experiences
as a STEM Ambassador were so much more
than something I could add to my CV. As
well as improving my own professional skills,
experience and confidence, I really felt as if
I was contributing to the futures of young
people by enthusing and motivating them to
find out more about psychology. For
example, I fooled children and adults into
thinking a rubber hand is their own hand;
used magic tricks to teach students about
awareness and attention; and explained how
the visual system works using impossible
objects and visual illusions. 
Now as a lecturer at The University of
Northampton, I have had the opportunity to
build on the relationship between Psycho-
logy and STEM. Many universities have a
faculty-based STEM programme, which
potentially isolates psychology from other
disciplines. Northampton has a unique inter-
disciplinary STEM Steering Group and its
own STEM Champions programme. This
brings together all areas of Science and
ensures that psychology has a clear STEM
membership. One of our most recent Getting
the Buzz from Science days involved more than
80 Year 3 girls from 10 Northampton
primary schools. For the first time at this
event, an interactive psychology workshop
appeared alongside other sessions on atomic
science, biodiversity and engineering. 
Being a psychologist requires individuals
to be problem solvers. Therefore, it is up to
us as psychologists to make sure that
psychology has a clear STEM membership.
For me, psychology is clearly a science, but it
is important that we continue to communi-
cate this and increase our involvement with
other disciplines. Even if we do not have the
opportunity to become a STEM Ambassador,
we can still promote the impact and applica-
tions of our research to local communities
and ensure that others can see the value of
our work. Not only will this improve our own
professional practice and employability
skills, but it might even inspire others to
forge a career in psychology.
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Annual Conference 2016
East Midlands Conference Centre, Nottingham
26–28 April 
Submissions now open
Themes:
 Faces  Ageing  Impact  Wellbeing
General submissions invited for all other research areas
New for 2016
Haiku Deck – simple yet powerful visuals that support verbal
presentations
Don’t miss your opportunity to share research, gather feedback and
inspire others. Visit our website for guidelines, key dates and to
register for Conference updates
SEPTEMBER 2015 saw the first-everjoint Developmental Section and SocialSection Annual Conference, which was
held in the beautiful and grand backdrop of
The Palace Hotel in Manchester. And what
better setting for this conference than the
diverse and multicultural city of Manchester,
with its vibrant gay village, edgy Northern
Quarter, China Town, and sprawling univer-
sities?
The conference programme provided an
extensive and well-provisioned list of presen-
tations, workshops, symposia and posters
from both sections, affording attendees the
opportunity to reflect on research from
psychologists from across the UK and 
overseas. 
Some of the research presented included
topics as diverse as the effect of ‘Sexist
humour on women’s perception of joke
funniness’ (Manuela Thomae et al., Univer-
sity of Winchester), ‘The prevention and
reversal of childhood learnt fear’ (Chris
Askew et al., Kingston University), ‘The
conflicting nature of adult Autistic Spectrum
Disorder diagnosis’ (Jennifer Mayer & Paul
Dickerson, University of Roehampton), and
‘Leadership and deviance’ (Carola Leicht,
University of Kent). The only difficulty atten-
dees had was choosing which talks to attend!
The University of Kent was well repre-
sented at this event with Professor Dominic
Abrams opening the conference with his
keynote speech and a number of Kent
academics and students showcasing their
research through posters and talks. Other
keynote speakers included Professors Hazel
Rose Markus, Tania Zittoun, and Malinda
Carpenter. The lunches provided a
wonderful opportunity for networking and
for delegates to meet all four keynote
speakers during a lunchtime ‘meet the
experts’ session, hosted by PsyPAG. The
conference dinner provided a further oppor-
tunity to meet with academics and students
alike, all whilst being serenaded by 
the evening’s jazz-swing entertainment
performed by Paul Pashley.
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Conference review:
The British Psychological Society
Developmental Section and Social Section
Annual Conference 2015
Kiran Purewal & Chloe Tyler
For the first time, the British Psychological Society held a conference that joined together the Developmental
and Social Sections. The event was held over three days (9–11 September) at The Palace Hotel, in the heart
of Manchester. Researchers often fall into both the Developmental and Social Sections and can find it difficult
to decide where to present their work. This joint annual conference provided the perfect opportunity for such
researchers to present their work to audiences of both developmental and social psychologists. With four
keynote speakers, a ‘meet the experts’ session, and a vast array of posters and talks, organisers of the event
should be proud to have planned and hosted such a large-scale and well thought-out conference. This article
discusses the range of talks and workshops presented at the event, along with two postgraduate researchers’
experiences of presenting their research for the first time.
9–11 September 2015, The Palace Hotel, Manchester.
Both Kiran Purewal and Chloe Tyler
(University of Kent) were first-time presenters
at this year’s joint conference, and reflect on
their experience as speakers and delegates.
Chloe: ‘Having just completed an MSc in
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations at
University of Kent, I presented my findings
on piloting a novel experiential mental
health stigma-reduction approach. While 
I was nervous, my presentation was chaired
well by Dr Keon West and the audience were
sympathetic and understanding to the fact
that it was my first time presenting at a
British Psychological Society (BPS) confer-
ence. It was a valuable and worthwhile expe-
rience, and I received positive feedback and
interest in my research. The conference was
particularly valuable as the members present
were in similar fields to my own research (i.e.
forms of intergroup contact), providing the
perfect opportunity to disseminate the novel
area of research I focus on. I presented my
research which examines experiential inter-
group contact, this intervention simulates
intergroup contact through role-playing
characters of an outgroup. The questions 
I received were appreciated, and peers
approached me following my presentation to
discuss this new area of research in the field
of intergroup contact. As a new postgraduate
researcher, and a second time BPS confer-
ence attendee, I found the conference to be
well prepared and the talks to be interesting
and varied, especially thanks to the joint
inclusion of both the social and develop-
mental sections. I would very much enjoy
returning next year when I have more find-
ings from my first year researching as a PhD
researcher!’
Kiran: ‘As a social and developmental
researcher I was excited to hear that both
sections would be joining forces for this
year’s annual conference. Along with
presenting a poster on influences on adoles-
cents’ body satisfaction, I was honoured to
be presenting my research on children’s
social inclusion intentions as part of 
Dr Nicola Abbott’s (Canterbury Christ
Church University) social exclusion sympo-
sium, with Professor Adam Rutland (Gold-
smiths University) as discussant. I enjoyed
presenting my research to a supportive and
interactive audience, who were eager to
learn more about our research. In addition
to learning about some fantastic work over
the course of three days, I thoroughly
enjoyed the workshop on ‘intergroup
contact among children and young people’.
This workshop provided a fast-paced
overview and summary of the findings and
research methods used in developmental
intergroup contact experiments. In my
opinion, the best part of this workshop was
hearing from both experts and audience
members on the directions that they would
like to see intergroup contact take in future
research and brainstorming creative and
novel methods to further develop the theory.
For me, the BPS Developmental and Social
Annual Conference provided a lot of motiva-
tion for the second year of my PhD and
inspired me to consider new approaches in
my work on children and young people’s
prejudices. The #devsocconf Twitter-feed
provides further evidence of just how bril-
liantly organised the event was and what an
enjoyable time all delegates had!’
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Developmental Section
Annual Conference 2016
14–16 September 2016, Hilton, Belfast
Conference Dinner to be held at Titanic Belfast on 15 September.
Keynotes and conference themes announced shortly.
Submissions open in November 2015.
www.bps.org.uk/dev2016 #devconf
Issue 97 December 2015 49
